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Specification and Verification of a Topology-Aware Access Control
Model for Cyber-Physical Space
Yan Cao, Zhiqiu Huang , Shuanglong Kan, Dajuan Fan, and Yang Yang
Abstract: The cyber-physical space is a spatial environment that integrates the cyber and physical worlds to provide
an intelligent environment for users to conduct their day-to-day activities. Mobile users and mobile objects are
ubiquitous in this space, thereby exerting tremendous pressure on its security model. This model must ensure
that both cyber and physical objects are always handled securely in this dynamic environment. In this paper,
we propose a systematic solution to be able to specify security policies of the cyber-physical space and ensure
that security requirements hold in these policies. We first formulate a topology configuration model to capture the
topology characteristics of the cyber and physical worlds. Then, based on this model, a Topology-Aware CyberPhysical Access Control model (TA-CPAC) is proposed, which can ensure the security of the cyber and physical
worlds at the same time by adjusting permission assignment dynamically. Then, the topology configuration and
TA-CPAC models are formalized by bigraphs and Bigraph Reactive System (BRS), respectively, allowing us to use
model checking to rationalize the consequences of the evolution of topological configurations on the satisfaction
of security requirements. Finally, a case study on a building automation access control system is conducted to
evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
Key words: cyber-physical space; topology configuration; access control; model checking; bigraphs
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Introduction

Computing and communication capabilities are
increasingly embedded into physical spaces, thereby
blurring the boundary between computational and
physical worlds. This phenomenon is reflected
by the notion of a cyber-physical system, where
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computational elements heavily interact with physical
entities to monitor the behaviors of physical processes
and the actuating actions to change their behaviors
in accordance with the corresponding physical
environment. A Cyber-Physical Space (CPP)[1] is a
special case of the cyber-physical system; this space
brings computation into the physical world to provide
an intelligent spatial environment for roaming users,
i.e., the smart building. In the CPP, users and resources
are highly mobile in the physical and cyber worlds,
which may result in ineffectiveness of the existing
security configuration. An urgent problem is how to
design adaptive and highly dependable technologies
to ensure that cyber and physical resources can
always be handled securely in different topology
environments. This study focuses on the access control
challenge which is critical among the numerous security
challenges facing the CPP, including authentication,
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reliability, denial-of-service attacks, etc.
Access control is an important information security
technology that manages requests from users to access
system resources. The security architecture of the open
system interconnection reference model (ISO7492-2),
which is proposed by the International Organization for
Standardization, states that the access control service
is an important component of security services and
plays an irreplaceable role in the security architecture.
The literature is rich in accounts of access control
models[2–11] . However, to the best of our knowledge, no
prior studies have considered the effect of the dynamic
topology environment on the system access control
model, including cyber and physical topologies.
First, the CPP is not a static paradigm[12] . The
dynamic actions of entities (e.g., movements of subjects
and objects, dynamic network communication) occur
continuously. These actions change the topology of
the cyber and physical spaces and may affect security
concerns of the system. For example, the bank teller
alone in the president’s office may be a security
threat to confidential files. Only when the president
is in the office can the teller enter. The president can
access the internal network only when he/she is not
communicating with the external network. Therefore,
the access control mechanism for the CPP should
be able to perform security policies adaptively to
react to topology changes in the physical and cyber
spaces. However, the existing access control models
for cyber-physical systems are only concerned with
topology information in the physical space, such as
location of subjects[3, 6] and proximity relationships
among subjects[4] .
Second, the CPP integrates computing and
communication capabilities into physical processes.
This integration enhances the intelligence of physical
systems, but it also complicates the security problems
because it involves the cyber security, physical security,
and the interactions security at the same time[13] . For
example, the president cannot exit the bank when
he/she has confidential files on his/her computer
(cyber-enabled physical access control). When a
patient is in the office, the doctor cannot read the
records of other patients (physical-enabled cyber access
control). Therefore, a unified access control model
that integrates physical access control and cyber access
control is required in order to efficiently manage
and implement security operations in this complex
environment.
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Third, the correctness of implementation of an access
control model is based on the premise that the access
control model is conflict free and conforms to the
predefined security requirements[14] . At present, many
organizations fall short of implementing the correct
policies. For example, in large organizations, 50% –
90% of employees have over-entitled access, which
presents opportunities for insiders to cause harm[15] . To
design robust security policies for mission-critical
systems, many researchers have addressed the issue
of access control policy verification using various
formal methods, e.g., NuSMV[16] , UML/OCL[6] ,
Alloy[11] , Colored Petri Nets (CPN)[3] , and ambient
calculus[17] . All of these methods, except ambient
calculus, cannot describe the topology of the physical
and cyber spaces intuitively, thereby complicating the
modeling process. The ambient calculus represents
the topology of the physical space to help identify
and prevent potential future violations of security
requirements, but the ability to represent the changes
in cyber topology (e.g. networks that have a dynamic
topology) is limited. Therefore, an appropriate method
is necessary to check the access control policies of the
CPP and detect security breaches in them.
In this study, we develop an effective access control
model and a rigorous security breach detection method
for the CPP. First, a topology configuration model
is proposed, which accounts for the key structure
and relationships of the operational environment.
Considering this model, we can understand how
topological changes affect security concerns. Second,
a Topology-Aware Cyber-Physical Access Control (TACPAC) model is presented. This model takes the RoleBased Access Control (RBAC, ANSI INCITS 3592004) model as the main framework, and the topology
attributes are added to the RBAC model to support
the dynamic permission assignment. These attributes
include location of subjects and objects, proximity
relationships among entities, activation states between
users and roles, etc. Third, to ensure highly dependable
access control policies, we select bigraphs and Bigraph
Reactive System (BRS) as the semantic domain to
perform the verification of security properties. Bigraphs
specify the topology configuration model of the CPP.
The BRS specifies actions defined in access control
policies. If an action is allowed by the current topology
configuration, it is executed and the configuration is
updated accordingly. The security properties are also
expressed by bigraphs, and their validity is checked by
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the model checking approach. A reduction algorithm
is proposed to reduce the search spaces in the process
of model checking. Finally, we evaluate our approach
through a case study to demonstrate its effectiveness
and feasibility.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized
as follows.
(1) A topology configuration model is proposed to
describe the topology of the operational environment.
(2) A TA-CPAC model for the CPP is proposed. This
model can ensure that cyber and physical resources are
handled securely no matter how the topology of the
operational environment changes.
(3) Bigraphs and BRS are used to represent the
topology of a cyber-physical space and rationalize the
consequences of topological changes on the satisfaction
of security requirements.
(4) A reduction algorithm is proposed to simplify the
modeling process.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 summarizes the related work. In Section 3,
the topology configuration and TA-CPAC models are
defined. In Section 4, transformation rules from the
topology configuration and TA-CPAC models to formal
methods are presented. In Section 5, our method is
validated using a building automation access control
system. Finally, in Section 6, we present a summary
of our work and highlight directions for future research.

2

Related Work

The cyber-physical space is becoming increasingly
pervasive across the critical infrastructure. The access
control model for this space has drawn close attention in
recent years. Chen et al.[2] proposed a reputation-based
access control model called R2BAC, which assigns
roles to users based on the reputation evaluation of their
past behaviors. Toahchoodee and Ray[3] proposed a
spatio-temporal role-based access control model where
authorization decision depends on the role of the user,
the locations of the subjects and objects, and the time
of access. Kirkpatrick et al.[4, 5] presented a proxRBAC model where the access control decision is not
only based on the requesting user’s location but also
considers the location of other users in the system.
Fadhel et al.[6] proposed a comprehensive framework
GemRBAC model that expresses the various types of
RBAC policies, including location-based policies, timebased policies, and so on. Huang et al.[7] proposed a
two-layer access control model by integrating attributes

499

into RBAC. The aboveground level is a standard RBAC
model extended with environment. The underground
level is used to represent security knowledge in terms
of attribute-based policies, which are easy to build
and can easily adapt to changes. Jin et al.[8] proposed
a novel Role-centric Attribute-Based Access Control
(RABAC) model that extends the RBAC model with
permission filtering policies. These filtering policies
constrain the available set of permissions based on
user and object attributes. All these models use
the physical context information (e.g., location of
subjects, proximity relationships among subjects) to
make decisions on access requests that occur in cyberspace. In other words, they only focus on cyber security.
Skandhakumar et al.[9] proposed a method that utilizes
Building Information Models (BIMs) to reduce the
incidents of error in the physical space. Turkmen et
al.[10] concerned with computing relaxations of physical
access policies to eliminate conflicting rules. Geepalla
et al.[11] proposed an STRBAC-PS model that considers
the physical topology aspects in access control
systems. A location graph is proposed in this model to
formalize the physical location. All these models focus
on physical security. For the convergence of physical
and cyber access control, Unal and Caglayan[18]
proposed an FPM-RBAC model that concerns the
location, proximity, and mobility aspects of entities in
mobile networks. This model considers the interplay
between the physical and cyber spaces but is not
concerned with the connectivity state between subjects
and objects, a key characteristic of cyber-space.
To ensure that an access control system is safe,
a reliable means is needed to verify that the
specified access control policies conform to the security
requirements and policy author’s intentions prior
to their implementation. Jha et al.[19] performed a
comparison between the use of the model checking
and the first-order logic programming for the security
analysis of access control policies and conclude that
the model checking is a promising method. Hu et
al.[16] verified the integrity, coverage, and confinement
properties of access control policies using Access
Control Policy Testing System (ACPTS) tool, which
is based on NuSMV and Automated Combinatorial
Testing Suite (ACTS) tools. Gouglidis et al.[20]
proposed the verification of secure inter operation
properties for RBAC systems using NuSMV tool.
These two verification works do not consider the
physical elements. The GemRBAC model proposed
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in Ref. [6] is formalized by UML/OCL to eliminate
conflicts. UML/OCL is a semi-formal method that
cannot verify behavioral properties. Toahchoodee et
al.[21] used Alloy to verify spatio-temporal RBAC
policies, but Alloy faces difficulty in deciding whether
a policy holds or not when the Alloy analyzer cannot
find a counterexample of a property in question within
a certain scope. Some researchers use CPN and Time
Automata (TA) approaches to verify spatio-temporal
RBAC policies[3, 22] . The location information in the
CPN is represented by tokens of a product color of
string variables. In the TA, an entity at a particular
location zone is represented as a time-automata. These
two methods easily cause a drastic increase in the
model state-space. Unal and Caglayan[17] used the
ambient calculus to specify the current state of a mobile
network and actions within security policies. The
ambient calculus encodes computation only as processalgebraic structural changes in a hierarchy and hinders
reasoning about communication and links in cyberspace. Pasquale et al.[23] proposed a visualization tool
for a smart space that allows security analysts to edit
the space topology and verify whether access control
policies meet security requirements, but this method
is based on the breadth-first graph search algorithm,
which does not concern security properties, such as the
separation-of-duty. All the methods introduced are not
supportive of mechanisms to reason about topological
characteristics of the CPP affected by both structures of
the spaces as well as by links.
Bigraphs and BRS are an emerging formalism
for describing static spatial and communication
relationships alongside a set of reaction rules that
defines dynamic behaviors. They have been considered
extensively in studies on modeling cyber and physical
Table 1

spaces. Walton and Worboys[24] used bigraphs to
support the description of scenes and narratives with
incomplete information, and provided a set reactions
rules dictating legal system transformations to support
goal-directed navigation. Tsigkanos et al.[25] used them
to support property verification of the smart building
adopting software engineering principles. Benford
et al.[26] used expanded BRS to explain observed
inconsistencies in user trials of Savannah game, and
reveal an incompleteness in design. By contrast, we
use bigraphs and BRS to analyze the correctness of
topology-aware access control policies in this study.
We compare existing studies on policy specification
and policy verification, and highlight our work in Table 1.

3

Topology-Aware Access
Cyber-Physical Space

Control

for

In this section, we first propose a topology configuration
model to express the topology configuration of the
operational environment. Then, the TA-CPAC model
is proposed. The separation of duty constraints is
supported in this model. Finally, authorization term is
defined to specify security policies.
3.1
3.1.1

Topology configuration description
Topology of cyber-physical space

Before explaining the topology of the CPP in detail, we
define some basic terms. Objects (also known as assets)
in the cyber-physical space are classified as physical
objects, hybrid objects, and cyber objects. Physical
objects are hardware devices equipped with sensors or
actuators. Cyber objects are digital entities located in
hybrid objects. Hybrid objects can be conceived as
having physical and cyber characteristics, which delimit
digital areas for cyber objects. The concept of entities

Comparison of related works.
Policy specification
Policy verification
Model
Reference
CS PS MS MO SO
FD
VT
p
R2BAC
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p
p
p
Spatio-temporal model
[3, 21]


Petri net or Alloy
CPN or Alloy analyzer
p
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Prox-RBAC
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GemRBAC
[6]



UML/OCL
USE
p
p
Two-layered access control model
[7]
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p
RABAC
[8]





p
p
Access control model with BIM
[9]





p
p
Physical access control model
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p
STRBAC-PS
[11]



Alloy
Alloy analyzer
p p
p
p
FPM-RBAC
[17, 18]

Ambient calculus Java language and NuSMV
p p
p
p
p
Our work
This paper
Bigraphs and BRS
BigMC
p
Notes: : support; : no support; CS: cyber security; PS: physical security; MS: mobile subjects; MO: mobile objects; SO:
communication between subjects and objects; FD: formal description; VT: verification tool.
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includes objects and users that are in the cyber-physical
space.
The topology refers to the structure in terms of the
key elements and their relationships that determine the
shape of the environment[27] . In a physical sense, a
topology denotes characteristics of the physical space,
such as deployment of the building, and location of
users. In cyber-space, a topology denotes the structural
characteristics of information, such as location of cyber
objects, and users accessing behaviors to objects. For
example, Fig. 1 shows the topology configuration of
a smart bank. The bank branch has a main area in
which customer businesses are handled and from which
private areas of the bank can be accessed, including a
server room, a client manager’s office, a teller’s office,
a president’s office, and an accountant’s office. A safe
room is in the president’s office. The safe and box
are the physical objects. The hybrid objects include a
cloudlet, a server, and mobile phones. The cyber objects
include file1, file2, and file3. The locations of entities
are shown in this figure intuitively. The communication
relationship is described by dotted lines. Alice logs in
the server in the president’s office.
The entities change their states continuously, which
may render the existing configuration ineffective. For
example, Bob can copy data from Alice, Bob can
enter the president’s office, and Alice can take file2
in the president’s office. If the security requirement
is that Bob does not have the right to get file2, then
the above actions can bring the topology configuration
into a violate state. Knowing where valuable assets
are placed and their relationships with other entities
is helpful to identify security controls that can protect
those assets. Thus, the topology configuration of the

Accountant office

Clark
(accountant)

Safe

Safe room

operational environment is an important factor in
achieving adaptive access control for the CPP.
3.1.2

Topology configuration model

The formal definition of the topology configuration
should include all the elements and relationships
introduced above.
Definition 1 Topology configuration model. The
topology configuration model is a 12-tuple:
CE D hUser, Role, Object, Lloc, Loco, UserRoleassign,
UserRoleactivate, RoleObject, ObjectLocation,
Locrelation, RoleLocation, UserLocationi.
(1) User, Role, and Object stand for the set of users,
roles, and objects that are in the cyber-physical space,
respectively.
(2) Lloc and Loco stand for the set of space locations
and object locations, respectively.
(3) UserRoleassign  User  Role indicates the set
of assignment relationships between users and roles in
the system.
(4) UserRoleactivate  User  Role indicates the set
of activation relationships between users and roles in
the current environment.
(5) UserLocation  User  Lloc indicates the set of
user-location relationships in the current environment.
(6) RoleLocation  Role  Lloc indicates the set of
role-location relationships in the current environment.
(7) ObjectLocation  Object  Loco indicates the
set of object-location relationships in the current
environment.
(8) RoleObject  Role  Object indicates the set of
access behaviors between subjects and objects in the
current environment.
(9)
Locrelation  Lloc  Lloc
indicates
the
reachability relationships of the physical spaces.

Server room

Teller office

Box

File1 File2
Server

Cloudlet File3

Port 8923

Port 5053

Tom
(teller, accountant)

Jone
(teller, clientmanager)

Corridor

Bob
(lobbymanager)

Alice
(president)
President office

Fig. 1
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Client manager office

Deployment of bank branch.

Main area
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.lri ; lrj / 2 Locrelation specifies that from the entrance
area of the building, we can go through location lri to
location lrj .
The set Lloc D flr1 ; lr2 ; : : : ; lrn jn 2 Ng represents
physical locations of the building, such as the main area
and the teller’s office. The set of Locrelation is taken
from the deployment of the building. The user-role
assignment is specified by the administrator of security
policies. Thus, Locrelation and UserRoleassign sets
are static and the same in all topology configurations.
Other sets vary in different environments based on the
actions that have already been executed. We define these
dynamic elements in the topology constraint set C ,
C D fUserRoleactivate; UserLocation; RoleLocation;
ObjectLocation; RoleObjectg. This set supports the
definition of the access control model, which is
elaborated in Section 3.2.
In addition, the descriptions of the location of objects
vary for different types of objects. For physical or
hybrid objects, the location is a member of the location
set Lloc. As cyber objects are located in hybrid objects,
the location of cyber objects consists of two layers: first
is the hybrid object and second is the location of this
hybrid object. For example, the first layer location of
file1 in Fig. 1 is the server, and the second layer location
is the server room. The topology configuration model of
Fig. 1 is defined in Appendix Table A1.
3.2
3.2.1

Specification of the topology-aware cyberphysical access control policy
TA-CPAC model

The topology configuration model only describes the
static characteristics of the operational environment.
The dynamic behaviors are defined in the TA-CPAC
model, which is depicted in Fig. 2.

Fig. 2

As users and objects are in the roaming state,
their location is an important parameter in security
policies. The data set consists of the following six
basic elements: users, roles, operations, objects, Lloc,
and Loco. The latter four form a new element of
permissions. In addition, the space locations are
included in the set objects because the behaviors of
entering and exiting a location in the physical space are
the key management point. The relation set includes the
Role enabling (RL), Object enabling (OL), Permission
enabling (PL), User-role Assignment (UA), User-role
Enabling (UE), and role-Permission Assignment (PA).
For a location, the visitor and executable permissions
are both constrained. These relationships are described
by the RL relation and PL relation, respectively. Users
are assigned a set of roles, and can enable different roles
in different locations, which are described by UA and
UE relations, respectively. Roles are associated with
different permissions in different locations, described
by the PA relation. The concept of user sessions is
a mapping of one user to some subset of enabled
roles according to the user’s location, allowing the user
selective activation and deactivation of these enabled
roles. Aside from the basic concepts, functions are
defined to describe the relationships among the basic
concepts.
Definition 2 TA-CPAC model. The TA-CPAC
model is defined as
(1) Users; Roles, Operations, Loco, and Lloc stand
for the set of users, roles, operations, object locations,
and space locations, respectively.
(2) UA  Users  Roles is the user-role assignment,
a many-to-many mapping user-to-role assignment
relation.
- assigned user.r W Roles/ ! 2Users is the mapping

TA-CPAC model.
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of a role r onto a set of users. Formally, assigned
user.r/ D fu 2 Usersj.u; r/ 2 UAg.
(3) RL  Roles  Lloc represents role enabling, a
many-to-many mapping role-to-location relation.
- LlocRole.lr W Lloc/ ! 2Roles is the mapping of a
location lr onto a set of roles. These roles are
called enabled roles for the location lr. Formally,
LlocRole.lr/ D fr 2 Rolesj.r; lr/ 2 RLg.
- RoleLloc.r W Roles/ ! 2Lloc is the mapping of a
role r onto a set of locations, where the role r can be
enabled. Formally, RoleLloc.r/ D flr 2 Llocj.r; lr/ 2
RLg.
(4) UE  Users  RL is the user-role enabling
relation.
- enabled user.r W Roles; lr W Lloc/ ! 2Users is the
mapping of an enabled role r in the location lr onto
a set of users. Formally, enabled user.r; lr/ D fu 2
Usersj.u; r/ 2 UA ^ .r; lr/ 2 RLg.
- enabled role.u W Users; lr W Lloc/ ! 2Roles is the
mapping of a user u in the location lr onto a set of roles.
Formally, enabled role.u; lr/ D fr 2 Rolesj.u; r/ 2
UA ^ .r; lr/ 2 RLg.
(5) Objects D fPhysicalobject; Hybridobject; Cyberobject; Llocg represents the set of objects to be protected
consists of physical objects, hybrid objects, cyber
objects, and space locations.
(6) OL  Objects  Loco represents object enabling,
a many-to-many mapping object-to-location relation.
(7) Perms D 2.OperationsOL/ is the set of permissions.
(8) PL  Perms  Lloc is permission enabling,
a many-to-many mapping permission-to-location
relation.
- LlocPerm.lr W Lloc/ ! 2Perms is the mapping of a
location lr onto a set of permissions. These permissions
are called enabled permissions for the location lr.
Formally, LlocPerm.lr/ D fp 2 Permsj.p; lr/ 2 PLg.
- PermLloc.p W Perms/ ! 2Lloc is the mapping
of a permission p onto a set of locations, where the
permission p can be enabled. Formally, PermLloc.p/ D
flr 2 Llocj.p; lr/ 2 PLg.
(9) PA  Roles  PL is the permission-role
assignment, a many-to-many mapping permissionto-role assignment relation.
- can AssignPerm.r; p; lr/ ) r 2 Roles^p 2 Perms^
lr 2 .RoleLloc.r/ \ PermLloc.p//. When the role r
can execute the permission p in the location lr, this
predicate returns TRUE. In the location lr, the role r
and the permission p are both enabled.
- enabled permission.r W Roles; lr W Lloc/ ! 2Perms
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represents the mapping of a role r onto a set of
permissions which are assigned to this role in the
location lr. These permissions are called enabled
permissions for the role r in the location lr. Formally,
enabled permission.r W Roles; lr W Lloc/ D fp 2 Permsj
can AssignPerm.r; p; lr/g.
- assigned permission.r W Roles/ ! 2PermsLloc is
the mapping of a role r onto a set of permissions
which are assigned to this role. Formally,
assigned permission.r W Roles/ D f.p; lr/ 2
PLjcan AssignPerm.r; p; lr/g.
(10) Sessions indicates the set of sessions.
- session user.s W Sessions/ ! Users is the mapping
of a session s onto a corresponding user.
- session role.sWSessions; lr W Lloc/ ! 2Roles represents
the mapping of the session s onto a set of roles
in the location lr. Formally, session role.s; lr/ 
enabled role.session user.s/; lr/.
(11) C1 D fUserRoleactivate; UserLocation; ObjectLocationg is the topology constraint set which restricts
the UE relation. C 2 D fObjectLocation; RoleLocation; RoleObjectg is the topology constraint
set which restricts the PA relation.
3.2.2

Separation of duty constraints on TA-CPAC
model

Separation of Duty (SoD) constraints are used to
enforce conflict of interest policies that organizations
may employ to minimize the likelihood of collusion
among individuals. In other words, SoD serves as a
requirement for critical operations, which are divided
among two or more subjects, so that no single subject
can compromise security. Two types of SoD are
involved in the TA-CPAC model: one is to restrict
the user-role relation, and the other is for the rolepermission relation.
Definition 3 Role Static Separation Of Duty
(RSSOD) and Location-Related Static Separation
Of Duty (LRSSOD). RSSOD and LRSSOD are
specified as follows:
(1) RSSOD  2Roles  N is a collection of conflicting
roles, .rs; n/ 2 RSSOD, where rs is a subset of roles
and n is a natural number, n > 2, with the property that
no user is assigned to n or more roles from the set rs.
Formally, 8.rs; n/ 2 RSSOD; 8t  rs W jtj > n )
T
assigned user.r/ D ∅.

r2t

(2) LRSSOD  2RolesLloc  N is a collection of
conflicting roles associated with their enabled locations,
.rl; n/ 2 LRSSOD, where rl is a subset of RL and n is a
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natural number n > 2, and no existing relationship that
n or more roles from the set rl are enabled for a user.
Formally, 8.rl; n/ 2 LRSSOD; 8t  rl W jt j > n )
T
enabled user.r; lr/ D ∅.
.r;lr/2t

Definition 4 Permission Static Separation Of Duty
(PSSOD) and Location-related Permission Static
Separation Of Duty (LPSSOD). PSSOD and LPSSOD
are specified as follows:
(1) PSSOD  2Perms  N is a collection of conflicting
permissions. .ps; n/ 2 PSSOD, where ps is a subset
of permissions and n is a natural number, n > 2,
with the property that no role is assigned to n or
more permissions from the set ps. Formally, 8r 2
Roles; .ps; n/ 2 PSSOD; 8t  ps W jt j > n ) t 6
S
enabled permission.r; lr/.
lr2Lloc

(2) LPSSOD  2PermsLloc  N is a collection of
conflicting permissions associated with locations.
.pl; n/ 2 LPSSOD, where pl is a subset of PL and n
is a natural number, n > 2, with the property that no
role is assigned to n or more permissions from the set
pl. Formally, 8r 2 Roles; .pl; n/ 2 LPSSOD; 8t  pl W
jt j > n ) t 6 assigned permission.r/.
RSSOD is a constraint on the UA relation. It
determines the set of conflicting roles that should not
be assigned to the same user. PSSOD is a constraint
on the PA relation to determine conflicting permissions
that cannot assign to the same role. For example,
.r1; r2; 2/ 2 RSSOD states that a user assigned to
role r1 cannot be assigned to role r2 or vice versa.
.p1; p2; 2/ 2 PSSOD states that a role has permission
p1, and then this role cannot be given permission
p2 or vice versa. LRSSOD and LPSSOD are for
supporting the location-restricted SoD. For example,
..r1; lr1/; .r2; lr1/; 2/ 2 LRSSOD states that the roles
r1 and r2 cannot be in enabled states at the same time
in the location lr1. ..p1; lr1/; .p2; lr2/; 2/ 2 LPSSOD
states that a role has permission p1 at location lr1,
and then this role cannot be assigned to permission
p2 at location lr2 or vice versa. RSSOD and PSSOD
constraints are not constrained by the location. In other
words, these constraints are valid for all locations.
3.2.3

Authorization term

To summarize the aforementioned policy elements, we
define the authorization term, which is the basic formal
construct used to specify access control policies.
Definition 5 Authorization term. An Authorization
Term (AT) is a tuple .u; r; op; o; lo; lr; c; c 0 /, where
.u; r; lr/ 2 UE, .r; op; o; lo; lr/ 2 PA.

(1) u 2 Users represents a user who puts forward the
access request.
(2) r 2 Roles indicates the role of the user.
(3) op 2 Operations is the operation executed by the
user. For this study, we assume a fixed set of operations
Operations D fenter; exit; open; close; login; logout;
copy; deleteg. More operations can be added if required.
(4) o 2 Object s is the object to be accessed.
(5) lo 2 Loco is an enabled location of the object.
(6) lr 2 Lloc is the physical location in which the
user puts forward the access request.
(7) c and c 0 are the topology constraint formulas on
UE and PA relations, respectively. They determine the
applicability of the authorization term.
The topology constraint formula c is obtained based
on Boolean operations on the set C1.
Definition 6 Topology constraint formula. The
topology constraint formula c is defined as follows:
(1)  is a topology constraint formula.
(2) If p is an element of the set C1, it is a topology
constraint formula.
(3) If p and q are the topology constraint formula, so
are p ^ q, p _ q, and :p.
The topology constraint formula c 0 is defined on the
set C 2. We omitted this definition for simplicity. These
formulas can support four types of topology constraints,
including activation, location, proximity, and
communication constraints. (1) Activation constraints
specify the activated roles of the user. (2) Location
constraints specify the location of users and objects. (3)
Proximity constraints specify the location relationships
among entities, including user proximity constraints,
object proximity constraints, and user and object
proximity constraints. (4) Communication constraints
specify the access behaviors between users and objects.
If the formula c is , then the enabling of the role is not
affected by topology constraints. If the formula c 0 is ,
then the execution of the permission is not affected by
topology constraints.
Example 1 We present some examples to explain
the authorization terms.
(1) John can activate the role “student” in the
classroom after Alice has activated the role “teacher”
in this room.
(2) When the patient records are in the doctor’s office,
the cleaner cannot enter this office (from the corridor).
(3) The manager in the main area cannot log in the
server and cloudlet simultaneously.
(4) When the president is in the president’s office, the

Yan Cao et al.: Specification and Verification of a Topology-Aware Access Control Model for Cyber-Physical Space

teller can log in the server in this office.
The type of the first item is the UE relation with
activation constraints. The second item is the PA
relation with location constraints. The third item is the
PA relation with communication constraints. The last
item is the PA relation with proximity constraints. The
formal representations are as follows:
(1) (John, student, classroom, UserRoleactivate
(Alice, teacher)^ UserLocation (Alice, classroom)).
(2) (cleaner, enter, doctoroffice, , corridor, :ObjectLocation (records, doctor office)).
(3) (manager, login, server, serverroom, mainarea,
: (RoleObject (manager, cloudlet) ^ ObjectLocation
(cloudlet, serverroom) ^ RoleLocation (manager,
mainarea))).
(4) (teller, login, server, serverroom, presidentoffice,
RoleLocation (president, presidentoffice)).

4

Security Analysis of TA-CPAC Model
Using Model Checking

In this section, we provide a formal framework for
policy administrators to verify security policies prior
to their implementation. Initially, the formal methods
of bigraphs and BRS are introduced. Then, the
transformation rules from the topology configuration
model to bigraphs and the TA-CPAC model to BRS are
proposed. Next, security properties are extracted from
the security requirements and expressed by bigraphs.
The validity of the security property is checked through
model checking. A reduction algorithm is proposed in
the last subsection to reduce the search space in the
model checking process.
4.1

topology configuration. Third, bigraphs and BRS not
only have a complete axiomatic system but also provide
graphical representations which are beneficial to the
user’s understanding.
Bigraphs consist of a place graph, a forest defined
over a set of nodes which is intended to represent
entities and their locality in terms of a containment
structure, and a link graph, a hypergraph composed
over the same set of nodes representing arbitrary linking
among those entities. Connections of an edge with
its nodes are called ports. The type of nodes, called
controls, is defined by a so-called signature. Figure 3
shows a bigraph structure. The upper part is a bigraph
F , and the lower part is its corresponding place graph
and link graph. V1 , V2 , V3 , and V4 are nodes shared
between the place graph and the link graph. The nodes
are nested to express the location containment. The
links include closed links, such as e1 , e2 , and open
links, such as the edge between V1 and x, V3 and y.
x and y are called outer names, which are expressed
by using links reaching to the top. Links reaching to
downward are called inner names. In addition, bigraphs
also have a special class of nodes called sites, which are
used to abstract the things we are not concerned with,
and are identified by the gray dotted frame.
Bigraphs represent the static aspects of systems. The
dynamic aspects are expressed by BRS, which includes
a set of reaction rules. These rules present possible
ways in which a system might be reconfigured. A
reaction rule has the form R ! R0 , where R is known
as the redex and R0 as the reactum. The redex and
reactum are both bigraphs. The intuitive definition of
the reaction rule is fairly straightforward. If we can find

Bigraphs and BRS

A modeling formalism for the CPP should allow
the representation of the topology of the operational
environment. It should also enable reasoning about the
effects of topological changes arising from execution
actions defined in security policies. We use bigraphs
and BRS that have a number of features which are
convenient for formal specifications of our models.
First, bigraphs consider both the structure and linking,
which help in modeling the topology configuration.
Second, BRS defines a set of reaction rules that
allows reasoning about possible future states that are
reachable from the current state. Thus, the actions
defined in access control policies can be modeled
through reaction rules, which are helpful for analyzing
whether the execution of actions can lead to a violated

505

x

y
1

0

2

V2

V1

V3
V4
e2

e1

(a) Bigraph F: ε →〈 3,{xy}〉
Root

0

1

V1 V2

2
V3

Outer name x
V1

V2
e1

V4

y
V3
e2 V4

(b) Place graph F P : 0 → 3 (c) Link graph F L :  → { x y }
Fig. 3

Bigraph F structure diagram.

Tsinghua Science and Technology, October 2019, 24(5): 497–519

506

an instance of the redex somewhere in a bigraph S , then
we may replace the redex with the reactum to obtain a
new bigraph S 0 in a manner similar to graph rewriting.
The preceding graphical representation is useful
to model but unwieldy for reasoning. Fortunately,
Milner[28] proposed the algebra description for bigraphs
and BRS, which is called term languages. A part
of the language is summarized in Table 2. U and
V are controls of nodes. Nodes can be structured
hierarchically through the nesting relationship. Two
nodes or regions at the same hierarchical level are
expressed by the juxtaposition relationships. The site
node is expressed by the letter $. In the last formula, the
node identified by the control K and port names in list
w also contains U . Ports that appear in a formula with
the same name are connected. The interested reader can
refer to the work by Milner[28] for complete definitions
and proofs of the theory.
4.2

Mapping from topology configuration model to
bigraphs

By using the place graph and link graph defined in
bigraphs, we can model the topology configuration
in a natural manner. We first introduce the formal
definition of bigraphs for the CPP and then discuss the
transformation rules from the topology configuration
model to the bigraphs.
Definition 7 Bigraphs for CPP. A concrete bigraph
for CPP B D .VB ; EB ; ctrlB ; prntB ; linkB / W hm; Y i !
hn; Y i consists of a concrete place graph F P D .VB ;
ctrlB ; prntB / W m ! n and a concrete link graph F L D
.VB ; EB ; ctrlB ; linkB / W X ! Y .
(1) F P D .VB ; ctrlB ; prntB / W m ! n, where an
inner face m and an outer face n are the numbers of sites
and regions, respectively. F P has a finite set of nodes
VB , a control map ctrlB W VB ! K, and a parent map
U
U
prntB W m VB 7! VB n. “7!” expresses that the
tail node is located in the direction node. K is the set of
signatures.
(2) F L D .VB ; EB ; ctrlB ; linkB / W X ! Y , where X
and Y are the set of inner names and outer names of the
Table 2
Term language
U:V
U kV
U jV
$i
Kw :.U /

Term languages for bigraphs.
Definition
Nesting (U contains V)
Juxtaposition of regions
Juxtaposition of nodes
Site number i
Node associated with control K having
ports with names in w. K contains U.

link graph. F L has a finite set of nodes VB , a finite set
of edges EB , a control map ctrlB W VB ! K, and a link
U
U
map linkB W X PB  EB Y . PB is a set of ports
of the node.
In the TA-CPAC model, users obtain permissions
by being members of roles. The correctness of
UE and PA relations is the key to obtain a
correct set of authorization terms. For the security
analysis of the UE relation, there is no need to
consider permissions. Furthermore, users need not
be considered for the security analysis of the PA
relation. Therefore, different models are established
for different relations. Transformation rule 1a converts
the topology configuration model to bigraphs for
analysis of the UE relation. The users, roles, objects,
and space locations are expressed by nodes. The
locations of subjects and objects, UA relation, and
reachability relationships in the physical spaces are
all expressed by the node nesting. The role, user,
and location nodes are nested sequentially. The link
graph represents the user-role activation relation by
linking port names. Transformation rule 1b converts the
topology configuration model to bigraphs for analysis
of the PA relation. The role node is directly nested
in the location node. The role-accessing behaviors
are expressed by link relationships. In these two
transformation rules, the outer names are instantiated
according to the specific application. The number
of region is one because we only consider a single
administrative domain in this study. The set K defines
the signatures of controls. The number of ports for
one control and their meaning depends on the system.
For our model, the port number of the role node is
one. In Transformation rule 1a, this port connects the
user’s port to express the user-role activation state. In
Transformation rule 1b, this port links the object’s port
to express the role-accessing state.
Example 2 Based on the transformation rules,
the graphical bigraphs representations of the bank
topology configuration model are shown in Fig. 4. In
general, bigraphs permit any kind of shape (sometimes
colors) for entities. In this figure, the circle, triangle,
hexagon, ellipse, rectangle, and rounded rectangle
stand for roles, cyber objects, physical objects, hybrid
objects, locations, and users, respectively. As the
mobile phone is private, the subject nodes are used
instead of the phone nodes for simplicity. Figure 4a
is one configuration of the bank system for analyzing
the UE relation. The corresponding term language is
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Transformation rule 1a: Transformation rule from the topology configuration model to bigraphs for analyzing
the UE relation
VB W User; Role; Object; Lloc ) VB /* Users, Roles, Objects, space locations map to nodes*/
ctrlB W VB ! K /*control map*/
prntB W .lri ; lrj / 2 Locrelation ) lrj 7! lri
/*reachability relationships in the physical space map to location containment*/
.o; lo/ 2 ObjectLocation ) o 7! lo
/*object-location relationships map to location containment*/
.u; r/ 2 UserRoleassign ^ .u; lr/ 2 UserLocation ) r 7! u ^ u 7! lr
/* subject-location relationships map to location containment. */
linkB W .u; r/ 2 UserRoleactivate ) PB .u/  ei ^ PB .r/  ei
/* user-role activation relationships map to the connectivity */
PB0  Y /*idle ports link to the outer name*/
EB D fe1 ; e2 ; : : : ; cn g/*set of edges*/
m D 0 /*number of sites is zero*/
n D 1 /*number of region is one*/
X D ∅ /*inter name is empty*/
Y : set of outer names for user, role, and object nodes.
where W “ ) ” stands for transformation relationships.
K D f.User; 1/; .Role; 1/; .Lloc; 0/; .Hybridobject; 1/; .Physicalobject; 1/; .Cyberobject; 0/g
Transformation rule 1b: Transformation rule from the topology configuration model to bigraphs for analyzing
the PA relation
VB W Role; Object; Lloc ) VB /* Roles,Objects,space locations map to nodes*/
ctrlB W VB ! K /*control map*/
prntB W .lri ; lrj / 2 Locrelation ) lrj 7! lri
/*reachability relationships in physical space map to location containment*/
.o; lo/ 2 ObjectLocation ) o 7! lo
/*object-location relationships map to location containment*/
.r; lr/ 2 RoleLocation ) r 7! lr
/* subject-location relationships map to location containment. */
linkB W .r; o/ 2 RoleObject ) PB .r/  ei ^ PB .o/  ei
/* subject accessing behaviors map to the connectivity */
PB0  Y /*idle ports link to the outer name*/
EB D fe1 ; e2 ; : : : ; cn g: /*set of edges*/
m D 0 /*number of sites is zero*/
n D 1 /*number of region is one*/
X D ∅ /*inter name is empty*/
Y : set of outer names for role and object nodes.
where W “ ) ” stands for transformation relationships.
K D f.Role; 1/; .Lloc; 0/; .Hybridobject; 1/; .Physicalobject; 1/; .Cyberobject; 0/g

mainarea: .Bobu : lobbymanageru j corridor: .Jone t :
(clientmanager t j tellerf / j accountantoffice:Clarks :
accountants j clientmanageroffice j presidentoffice:
.saferroom:safeb jAlicew : presidentw /jtelleroffice:.boxa j
Tomv :.tellerv jaccountantc //jserverroom:.serverd :.file1j
file2/jcloudlete :file3///. Figure 4b is one configuration
for analyzing the PA relation. The term language is
mainarea:.lobbymanagere j corridor:.clientmanagerf j
accountantoffce:accountantg jpresidentoffice:.saferoom:
safeb jpresidentx /jclientmanagerofficejtelleroffice:.boxa j
tellerc / j serverroom:.serverx :.file1 j file2/ j cloudletd :

file3///. The letters a; b; c; d; e; f; and g are outer
names of nodes. The nodes with the same subscript
letters are connected by links.
4.3

Mapping from TA-CPAC model to BRS

Having defined how bigraphs provide static semantics
of the CPP, we proceed to consider the actions defined
in security policies, thereby giving rise to dynamic
features. These actions are formalized by BRS.
Owing to the length limitation, the transformation
templates in Transformation rule 2 only involve
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Bigraphs of bank topology configuration model.

Transformation rule 2: Transformation rule from authorization terms to reaction rules
UE:.u; r; lr/ ) lr:.ua :.rb :$0j$1/j$2/ ! lr:.ux :.rx :$0j$1/j$2/
PA: .r; e nt er; lr1; ; lr2/ ) lr2:.rb :$0jlr1:$1j$2/ ! lr2:.lr1:.rb :$0j$1/j$2/
.r; exi t; lr; ; lr/ ) lr:.rb :$0j$1/ ! rb :$0jlr:$1
.r; ope n; o; lo; lr/ ) lr:.ra :$0job :$1j$2/j$3 ! lr:.rx :$0jox :$1j$2/j$3
.r; close; o; lo; lr/ ) lr:.rx :$0jox :$1j$2/j$3 ! lr:.ra :$0job :$1j$2/j$3
.r; logi n; o; lo; lr/ ) .1/lr:.ra :$0job :$1j$2/j$3 ! lr:.rx :$0jox :$1j$2/j$3
.2/lr  :.ra :$0j$1/jlo :.ob :$2j$3/j$4 ! lr  :.rx :$0j$1/jlo :.ox :$2j$3/j$4
.r; logout; o; lo; lr/ ) .1/lr:.rx :$0jox :$1j$2/j$3 ! lr:.ra :$0job :$1j$2/j$3
.2/lr  :.rx :$0j$1/jlo :.ox :$2j$3/j$4 ! lr  :.ra :$0j$1/jlo :.ob :$2j$3/j$4
.r; copy; o; lo; lr/ )
.1/lr:.rx :$0jLoco1.lo/x :.oj$1/j$2/j$3 ! lr:.rx :.oj$0/jLoco1.lo/x :.oj$1/j$2/j$3
.2/lr  :.rx :$0j$1/jLoco2.lo/ :.Loco1.lo/x :.oj$2/j$3/j$4 ! lr  :.rx :.oj$0/j$1/jLoco2.lo/ :.Loco1.lo/x :.oj$2/j$3/j$4
.r; delet e; o; lo; lr/ )
.1/lr:.rx :$0jLoco1.lo/x :.oj$1/j$2/j$3 ! lr:.rx :$0jLoco1.lo/x :$1j$2/j$3
.2/lr  :.rx :$0j$1/jLoco2.lo/ :.Loco1.lo/x :.oj$2/j$3/j$4 ! lr  :.rx :$0j$1/jLoco2.lo/ :.Loco1.lo/x :$2j$3/j$4
.3/lr:.ra :.oj$0/j$1/j$2 ! lr:.ra :$0j$1/j$2

eight operations and can be extended easily by
administrators. As physical objects require that
accessibility is the subject-object proximity, the
authorization terms of the open and close operations
are both mapped to one reaction rule. Hybrid and cyber
objects can be accessed remotely, so the authorization
terms of the login, logout, and copy operations are
mapped to two reaction rules. When the objects
and subjects are co-located, we obtain the first one.
Otherwise, the second one is obtained. The delete
action is mapped to three reaction rules because this
action can also occur in the user’s mobile phone.
For the location of cyber objects, two functions are
defined: Loco2.lo/, which returns the space location,
and Loco1.lo/, which returns the hybrid objectlocation. The stars in lr and lo represent that they
are at the same hierarchical level in bigraphs. For
the bank example, the role lobby manager can copy

file3 from the cloudlet in the main area. The redex is
mainarea:.lobbymanagery :$1 j corridor:.serverroom:
.cloudlety :file3 j $2/ j $3//. The reactum is mainarea:
.lobbymanagery :.file3 j $1/ j corridor:.serverroom:
.cloudlety :file3j$2/j$3//. In the redex and reactum, the
server room is extended to the main area which is in the
same hierarchy with the location of the lobby manager.
The stars in lr and Loco2.lo/ have the same meaning.
Transformation rule 2 describes the transformation
templates from authorization terms without topology
constraints to reaction rules. When the authorization
terms involve topology constraints, both the redex and
reactum must satisfy these topology constraints.
Example 3 A security policy of the bank branch is
“the client manager enters the president’s office only
when the president is in there”. This requirement is
expressed as (clientmanager, enter, presidentoffice, ,
corridor, RoleLocation(president, presidentoffice). The
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corresponding graphical bigraph is shown in Fig. 5.
Considering the enter transformation rule, we obtain
the redex corridor:.clientmanagera :$0 j presidentoffice:
.presidentb :$1 j $2/ j $3/, and the reactum corridor:
.presidentoffice:.clientmanagera :$0jpresidentb :$1j$2/j
$3/. The redex and reactum both satisfy the location
constraint “the president is in the president’s office”.
Given a bigraph that describes the initial
configuration, the system evolves by applying reaction
rules, which model the occurrence of possible actions,
generating new configurations. At each step, only
the redex that matches the current configuration
is selected. Several reaction rules may be possible
for one configuration, thus branching off possible
new configurations. Eventually, we obtain a Labeled
Transition System (LTS).
4.4

Security requirements

A property for a given configuration can be expressed
by bigraphs. A configuration described by a bigraph B
satisfies a property D if the property D can be matched
against B, exactly in the same way a redex is matched
against a bigraph to apply a reaction rule. Failure to
match the property D against B means that the property
D is not satisfied in this configuration. The utilization
of sites in the bigraph specifying the property that is
checked against B indicates that the portion of B that
matches a site does not affect the property. Checking
properties only for a configuration is not enough;
thus, we have to check system temporal requirements.
Section 4.3 shows that the security policies are modeled
as an LTS induced by reaction rules, so the modeling is
a
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conducted by predicting the branching structure using
the branching Computation Temporal Logic (CTL). In
CTL, two path quantifiers are A for “all paths” and E
for “an existing path”. Two common operators used to
express state formula are G which is “in all states” and
F which is “there exists some state”.
We have introduced SoD constraints in Section
3.2.2, which cannot be violated. But beyond that, the
correctness of relations defined in the TA-CPAC model
also need to be checked. We present one example and
its corresponding formal representation for each type of
security requirement in Table 3.
4.5

Reduction approach

For the UE relation, the maximum number of explored
rolenum
1
2
states is ..Crolenum
C Crolenum
C    C Crolenum
/  lrnum C
usernum
1/
, where lrnum; rolenum, and usernum are the
number of locations, roles, and users, respectively.
Every user owns all roles and activates one role,
two roles, and so on until all roles are activated
in every location. This relationship is represented
by combination formula. In addition, the user can
deactivate all roles, so the formula adds one. This
formula shows that the number of states increases
exponentially with the number of users. For the PA
relation, the maximum number of explored states is
lrnumrolenum  pernumrolenum , where pernum is the
number of permissions. We assume that every role can
obtain all permissions in every location. The number of
states increases exponentially with the number of roles.
Analyzing all explored states for a property has a
negative effect on the analysis performance because
some states and paths in the LTS model are irrelevant
to the property to be verified. We first propose some
definitions, which contribute to selecting the relevant
elements of a property, and then provide an algorithm
to select the related authorization terms based on these
definitions.
Definition 8 Interactive relationship of users. If
the topology constraints of the user uj ’s UE relation

Table 3 TA-CPAC constraints and bigraphs representation.
Constraint
Bigraphs representation
Security requirement
OL
AG:.lr:.o3a :.o1jo2j$0/j$1/
The cyber objects o1 and o2 cannot be co-located in the hybrid
object o3 which is in the location lr.
UE
EF .lr:.ux :.rx j$0/j$1/j$2/
The role r is enabled for the user u in the location lr.
PA
EF .lr  :.rx j$0/jlo :.ox j$1/j$2/
Eventually, the role r can log in the hybrid object o in the
location lr (lr ¤ lo).
RSSOD
AG:.ua :.r1b jr2c j$0/j$1/
The roles r1 and r2 are conflicting roles.
LPSSOD AG:.lr  :.ry :$0j$1/jlo1 :.o1y j$2/jlo2 :.o2y j$3/j$4/ The permissions logging in the hybrid objects o1 and o2 are
conflicting permissions in the location lr .
LRSSOD AG:.lr:.ux :.r1x jr2x j$0/j$1/j$2/
The roles r1 and r2 can not be both enabled in the location lr.
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involve the user ui ’s state or vice versa, then the users
uj and ui have an interactive relationship.
Definition 9 Enclosed users. The enclosed users
of a user u is a set that includes all the users who
have interactive relationships with the user u in the UE
relation.
Definition 10 Interactive relationship of roles. If
the topology constraints of the role rj ’s PA relation
involve the role ri ’s state or vice versa, then the roles
rj and ri have an interactive relationship.
Definition 11 Enclosed roles. The enclosed roles
of a role r is a set which includes all the roles who
have interactive relationships with the role r in the PA
relation.
Definition 12 Interactive relationship of locations.
If the authorization terms in the location lri are
constrained by the topological states of the location lrj
or vice versa, then the locations lrj and lri have an
interactive relationship.
Definition 13 Enclosed locations. The enclosed
locations of a location lr is a set that includes all the
locations, which have interactive relationships with the
location lr in authorization terms.
Based on the concepts of enclosed users, enclosed
roles, and enclosed locations, Algorithm 1 is proposed
to select the property-related authorization terms. In
this algorithm, we first extract the subjects and locations
involved in the property. If the property relates with
users, the SP1 set is selected based on the enclosed
users. Otherwise, the SP1 set is selected based on the
enclosed roles. Next, the subset SP2 is chosen from the
set SP1 according to the enclosed locations.
Based on the definition of enclosed users, enclosed
roles, and enclosed locations, the subjects and locations
that are not in the enclosed sets are independent from
the subjects and locations involved in the property.
When the subjects s1 and s2 are independent, the
behaviors of the subject s1 do not affect the subject
s2 and vice versa. When the locations lr1 and lr2 are
independent, the executable behaviors in area lr1 do not
affect the behaviors in area lr2 and vice versa. Line
1 in Algorithm 1 aims to select the related subjects
and locations. Lines 2–17 select the authorization terms
based on the enclosed subjects, where lines 2–9 are
based on the enclosed users and lines 11–17 are based
on the enclosed roles. Lines 19–22 further select
the related authorization terms based on the enclosed
locations. Therefore, Algorithm 1 can ensure that
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Algorithm 1
Selecting sub-authorization terms for a
security property
Require: Property p, UE; PA;
Ensure: sub-authorization terms for property p;
1: enSet D ExtractEntities.p/;
/*get elements from the property, including subjects and
locations*/
2: U D GetUsers.enSet/;
3: if U Š D NULL then
4:
u D GetFirstElement.U /;
5:
while uŠ D NULL do
6:
cu D cu C GetEnclosedUsers.u; UE/;
/*get enclosed users of the user u*/
7:
u D GetNextElement.U /
8:
end while
9:
SP1 D SearchSecurityPolicies1.cu; UE/;
/*search user-role authorization terms based on enclosed
users */
10: else
11:
R D GetRoles.enSet/;
12:
r D GetFirstElement.R/;
13:
while rŠ D NULL do
14:
cr D cr C GetEnclosedRoles.r; PA/;
/*obtain enclosed roles of the role r*/
15:
r D GetNextElement.R/
16:
end while
17:
SP1 D SearchSecurityPolicies2.cr; PA/;
/*search role-permission authorization terms based on
enclosed roles*/
18: end if
19: LR1 D GetLocations.enSet/;
20: SP2 D SearchSecurityPolicies3.LR1; SP1/;
/*search authorization terms based on locations involved in
property p*/
21: LR2 D GetEnclosedLocations.SP2/;
/*obtain enclosed locations from topology constraints of
SP2*/
22: SP2 D SP2 C SearchSecurityPolicies3.LR2; SP1/;
/*further search authorization terms based on enclosed
locations*/
23: return SP2;

unselected authorization terms do not contain elements
that affect the property to be verified.

5
5.1

Evaluation
Case study

In this section, we illustrate the proposed model
and verification method for a modern bank branch.
We simplify this scenario to demonstrate the method
introduced above. The deployment of the bank
is described in Section 2. The initial topology
configuration model and access control policies of the
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bank are shown in Appendix A. We extract some
important security requirements and check whether the
security policies conform to them.
(1) The teller can own file2 in the accountant’s office
only when the president and accountant are both in this
place.
(2) The president cannot enter the safe room when
someone is in the president’s office.
(3) The president cannot exit the president’s office
when file2 is on her mobile phone.
(4) The client manager cannot log in the server and
cloudlet simultaneously in the client manager’s office
and main area.
(5) When the box is opened or closed by the teller,
the accountant or president is in the teller’s office.
(6) The teller and accountant are conflicting roles in
the teller’s office.
To support our approach, we created a prototype
tool that transforms the topology configuration model
and access control policies to the term language based
on the transformation rules. The interface of the tool
is shown in Fig. 6. The topological elements of the

Fig. 6
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Property 1
Property 2

Property 3
Property 4
Property 5
Property 6
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environment are input in the left part. These input
parameters are formalized as the initial model. The
access control policies are input in the right part. These
parameters are formalized as reaction rules. Then, the
initial model and reaction rules are organized and used
as input to BigMC[29] , which is a model checking
tool for bigraphs and BRS, developed by Gian Perrone
at IT University of Copenhagen. The verification is
conducted on a Linux platform with 4 GB RAM using
an Intel (R) Core i7-4710MQ 2.5 GHz processor.
The
bigraphs
representations
of
security
requirements are presented in Table 4. The checking
results are listed in Table 5, including enclosed
subjects, enclosed locations, explored states, and
required modeling time. We have proposed suggestions
to solve the violated security properties in our previous
work[30] . The final decision is obtained through
discussion with the administrator.
Property 1 The property type of the first requirement
is the PA relation with proximity constraints. The
involved subjects in this property include the president,
teller, and accountant. The involved location in this

Access control policies to BigMC language transformation tool.

Table 4 Bigraphs representations of properties.
Bigraphs representation
AG:.presidenta jaccountoffice:.tellerm :file2j$0/ ^ accountantd jaccountoffice:.tellerm :file2j$0/^
presidenta jaccountantd jaccountantoffice:.tellerm :file2j$0//
AG:.presidentoffice:.saferoom:.presidenta jsafeb /jaccountantd j$0/j$1^
presidentoffice:.saferoom:.presidenta jsafeb /jtellerf j$0/j$1^
presidentoffice:.saferoom:.presidenta jsafeb /jclientmanagerg j$0/j$1^
presidentoffice:.saferoom:.presidenta jsafeb /jlobbymanagerh j$0/j$1/
EF.presidenta :file2jpresidentoffice:$0j$1/
AG:.mainarea:.clientmanagerx :$0jcorridor:.serverroom:.serverx :$1jcloudletx :$2/j$3//^
clientmanageroffice:clientmanagerx :$0jserverroom:.serverx :$1jcloudletx :$2/j$3/
AG:.telleroffice:.tellerx jboxx /jaccountanta jpresidentb j$0/
EF.telleroffice:.Tomx :.tellerx jaccountantx ///
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Property
Property 1
Property 2
Property 3
Property 4
Property 5
Property 6

Table 5 Performance results.
Enclosed subject
Enclosed location
president, accountant, teller
accountant office
president, lobby manager,
president office, safe room
accountant, client manager, teller
president, lobby manager,
president office
accountant, client manager, teller
client manager
client manager office, main area,
corridor, server room
teller, accountant, president
teller office
Tom
teller office

property is the accountant’s office. The topology
constraints in the p23 and p27 permissions of the
teller, the p24 permission of the accountant, and the
p23 permission of the president do not involve new
elements. Therefore, the related permissions are in
the enabled permission .president; accountantoffice/,
enabled permission .accountant; accountantoffice/,
and enabled permission .teller; accountantoffice/ sets.
This property is violated. The counterexample path
is shown in Fig. 7. To solve this problem, the p24
permission of the president and accountant is given the
topology constraint : ObjectLocation .file2; .teller;
accountantoffice//.
Property 2 The property type of the second
requirement is the PA relation with proximity
constraints. The involved subjects of this property
are the roles of president, accountant, teller, client
manager, and lobby manager. The involved locations
are the president’s office and safe room. The topology
constraints in the p12 permission of the president,
and the p11 permission of the client manager, teller,
accountant, and lobby manager do not involve
new elements. Thus, the related permissions are in
the enabled permission .president; presidentoffice/,
enabled permission .accountant; presidentoffice/,
enabled permission .clientmanager; presidentoffice/,

Fig. 7

Explored state
190
3890

Time (s)
0.195 029
8.866 34

1514

2.779 99

41

0.0276 46

356
4

0.319 504
0.005 211

enabled permission .lobbymanager; presidentoffice/,
enabled permission .teller; presidentoffice/, and
enabled permission .president; saferoom/ sets. This
property is violated. To solve this problem, the p19
permission of the president is given the topology
constraints :.c110 ^ c120 ^ c130 ^ c140 /.
Property 3
The property type of the third
requirement is the PA relation with location
constraints. The involved subject of this property
is the role of president. The involved location is
the president’s office. The topology constraints
in the p12 permission of the president are about
the roles of accountant, client manager, lobby
manager, teller, and the location of president’s
office. Therefore, the related permissions are in
the enabled permission .president; presidentoffice/,
enabled permission .accountant; presidentoffice/,
enabled permission .clientmanager; presidentoffice/,
enabled permission .lobbymanager; presidentoffice/,
and enabled permission .teller; presidentoffice/ sets.
This property is not violated.
Property 4 The property type of the fourth
requirement is the PA relation with communication
constraints. The involved subject of this property is
the role of the client manager. The involved locations
are the client manager’s office, corridor, server room,

Counterexample path.
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Performance analysis

In this section, the performance of the policy
verification method is evaluated by varying the number
of users, roles, and locations. Although hundreds or
thousands of subjects exist in an organization, only
the enclosed subjects and locations are involved in a
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Fig. 8 Number of explored states and the time for the UE
relation with varying number of enclosed users.
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5.2

verified property in our method. The maximum number
of enclosed users for the UE relation is set to five.
The maximum number of enclosed roles for the PA
relation is set to five. The maximum number of enclosed
locations is set to six. These parameters were selected
to match those used in Ref. [22].
In Fig. 8, we vary the number of enclosed users,
considering that the number of enclosed roles and
the number of enclosed locations are both two. xaxis represents the number of enclosed users and yaxis represents the number of states explored and time
required. Figure 9 shows the number of explored states
and time required by varying the number of enclosed
roles, considering that the number of locations is two
and the number of permissions is four. These two
figures show that explored states and the execution time
increase exponentially with the increase in the number
of users and roles. When the number of users increases,
the number of states combination of users increases
significantly. For example, two roles are assigned to
each user. The user can activate two roles, one role,
and zero role. The number of states of a user is four.
If five users are involved, then the number of states is
1024. When the number of roles increases, the sequence
of actions among them becomes complicated. For
example, three subjects enter a location. The behavior
sequence among them is not constrained. The number

Nnumber of explored states

and main area. The permissions of the role client
manager in these locations do not involve topology
constraints. Therefore, the related permissions are in
the enabled permission .clientmanager; mainarea/,
enabled permission .clientmanager; corridor/, enabled
permission .clientmanager; clientmanageroffice/, and
enabled permission .clientmanager; serverroom/ sets.
This property is violated. To solve this problem, the p37
permission of the client manager is given the topology
constraints :.RoleObject .clientmanager; cloudlet/ ^
RoleLocation .clientmanager; clientmanageroffice/ ^
ObjectLocation .cloudlet; serverroom//. The p41
permission of the client manager is given the topology
constraints : .RoleObject .clientmanager; server/ ^
RoleLocation .clientmanager; clientmanageroffice/ ^
ObjectLocation .server; serverroom//.
Property 5
The property type of the fifth
requirement is the PA relation with proximity
constraints. The involved subjects of this property are
the roles of the teller, accountant, and president. The
involved location is the teller’s office. The topology
constraint c100 in permissions of the accountant and
president is about the role of the teller and the location
of the teller’s office. Therefore, the related permissions
are in the enabled permission .president; telleroffice/,
enabled permission .accountant; telleroffice/, and
enabled permission .teller; telleroffice/ sets. This
property is violated. To solve this problem, the p46 and
p47 permissions of the teller are given the topology
constraints RoleLocation .accountant; telleroffice/ jj
RoleLocation .president; telleroffice/.
Property 6
The property type of the sixth
requirement is the LRSSOD. Only Tom is assigned
the roles teller and accountant. The involved subject
of this property is Tom. The involved location
is the teller’s office. Therefore, the related roles
are in the enabled role .Tom; telleroffice/ set. This
property is violated. The UE relation .Tom; accountant;
telleroffice/ is rescinded.
When the UE and PA relations are modified, we only
need to re-verify a part of properties in which the related
authorization terms are changed.
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Fig. 9 Number of explored states and the time for the PA
relation with varying number of enclosed roles.
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of states is eight. If ten subjects enter a location, then the
number of states is 1024. Thus, the number of subjects
is the most effective factor in the number of explored
states and required time. As shown in Fig. 10, we vary
the number of enclosed locations, considering that the
number of enclosed users and number of enclosed roles
are both two. x-axis represents the number of enclosed
locations and y-axis represents the number of states
explored and required time. Figure 11 is used to analyze
the PA relations by varying the number of enclosed
locations. The numbers of roles and permissions are
two and four, respectively. These two figures indicate
that the number of locations is proportional to the
explored states and required time in UE relation and PA
relation.
These experimental results are consistent with our
theoretical analysis introduced in Section 4.5 and also
show the effectiveness of our reduction algorithm.
Meanwhile, this conclusion can guide the generation of
policies that facilitate security analysis.

6

0.1

model is necessary to ensure that cyber and physical
resources are both handled securely regardless of how
the operational environment changes. To meet these
requirements, this study proposes a TA-CPAC model
and an approach for engineering security policies. We
first present the topology configuration model, which
can provide valuable contextual indicators for the
access decision. Based on this model, the TA-CPAC
model is presented, which integrates the physical access
control and cyber access control, and can ensure the
security of the cyber and physical spaces at the same
time. Then, we use bigraphs and BRS to represent and
rationalize our proposed security policies to ensure their
conformity with security requirements. A reduction
algorithm is also proposed to simplify the reasoning
process. Finally, we demonstrate the applicability of
our approach through a case study. Our findings are
encouraging and provide evidence of the feasibility of
the approach.
We have identified and are pursuing a number
of promising avenues for further investigations. This
paper only considers the access control for a single
administrative domain. Multiple domains may need to
cooperate with each other to achieve common goals.
Our next work aims to focus on how to realize secure
cross-domain operations in collaborative cyber-physical
spaces. In emergency situations, access levels might
need to be temporarily downgraded or reconfigured to
bring the system under control. We will also study
how to manage the risk scenario in the CPP. We
aim to provide a complete policy framework for the
CPP with an integrated specification, verification, and
enforcement environment.
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Appendix A: Topology configuration model and TA-CPAC model of the bank branch.
Table A1
Set

Topology configuration model of Fig. 1.
Value

fAlice, Bob, Tom, Jone, Clarkg
fpresident, lobbymanager, accountant, teller, clientmanagerg
fserver, cloudlet, box, safe, file1, file2, file3, Alicephone, Bobphone, Tomphone, Jonephone, Clarkphoneg
fsaferoom, accountantoffice, serverroom, presidentoffice, clientmanageroffice, telleroffice, mainarea, corridorg
fsaferoom, accountantoffice, serverroom, presidentoffice, clientmanageroffice, telleroffice, mainarea, corridor,
server, cloudlet, Alicephone, Bobphone, Tomphone, Jonephone, Clarkphoneg
UserRoleassign f(Alice, president), (Bob, lobbymanager), (Clark, accountant), (Tom, accountant), (Tom, teller), (Jone, teller),
(Jone, clientmanager)g
UserRoleactivate f(Alice, president), (Jone, clientmanager), (Bob, lobbymanager), (Tom, teller), (Clark, accountant)g
UserLocation
f(Alice, presidentoffice), (Bob, mainarea), (Clark, accountantoffice), (Tom, telleroffice), (Jone, corridor)g
RoleLocation
f(president, presidentoffice), (lobbymanager, mainarea), (accountant, accountantoffice), (teller, telleroffice),
(clientmanager, corridor)g
ObjectLocation f(server, serverroom), (cloudlet, serverroom), (box, telleroffice), (safe, saferoom), (file1, server, serverroom),
(file2, server, serverroom), (file3, cloudlet, serverroom), (Alicephone, presidentoffice), (Bobphone, mainarea),
(Clarkphone, accountantoffice), (Tomphone, telleroffice), (Jonephone, corridor)g
Locrelation
f(mainarea, corridor), (corridor, serverroom), (corridor, telleroffice), (corridor, presidentoffice),
(corridor, clientmanageroffice), (corridor, accountantoffice), (presidentoffice, saferoom)g
RoleObject
f(president, server)g

User
Role
Object
Lloc
Loco

Table A2

User
Alice
Bob
Clark
Tom
Tom
Jone
Jone

Role
president
lobby manager
accountant
accountant
teller
teller
client manager

UE relation with topology constraints.
Location and topology constraint
corridor, teller office, president office, safe room, main area, accountant office
corridor, main area, president office
main area, corridor, accountant office, teller office, president office
main area, corridor, accountant office c1, teller office, president office
main area, client manager office, corridor, accountant office c2, teller office, president office
main area, corridor, client manager office, president office, teller office, accountant office
corridor, client manager office, president office, mainarea

Table A3

Role
President
Clientmanager
Teller
Accounant
Lobbymanager

PA relation with topology constraints.
Permission and topology constraint
p1 p6; p7 c100 ; p8 c100 ; p9 p11, p12 :.c110 ^ c120 ^ c130 ^ c140 ^ c150 /
p13 p22; p23 c70 ; p24 p30
p9; p10; p11 c60 ; p12 p14; p18; p31 p45
p1 p4; p6; p9; p10; p11 c60 ; p12 p14; p18; p23 c70 ; p24 p26; p27 c80 ; p30; p35; p36; p46 p51
p1 p4; p6; p9; p10; p11 c60 ; p12 p14; p18; p23; p24 :.c80 ^ c90 /; p25; p26; p27 c80 ; p30; p46 c100 ,
p47 c100 ; p52 p55
p9; p10; p11 c60 ; p12 p14; p18; p31 :.c40 ^ c50 ^ c30 /; p32; p34; p56 :.c10 ^ c20 ^ c30 /; p57 p59
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Table A4
No.
p1
p2
p3
p4
p5
p6
p7
p8
p9
p10
p11
p12
p13
p14
p15
p16
p17
p18
p19
p20
p21
p22
p23
p24
p25
p26
p27
p28
p29
p30
p31
p32
p33
p34
p35
p36
p37
p38
p39
p40
p41
p42
p43
p44
p45
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Permissions of the bank.

Permission
enter telleroffice () corridor
exit telleroffice () telleroffice (enter corridor () telleroffice)
login server (server, serverroom) telleroffice
copy file1 (server, serverroom) telleroffice
delete file1 (president, telleroffice) telleroffice
logout server (server, serveroom) telleroffice
open box (telleroffice) telleroffice
close box (telleroffice) telleroffice
enter corridor () mainarea
enter mainarea () corridor
enter presidentoffice () corridor
enter corridor () presidentoffice
login server (serverroom) presidentoffice
copy file1 (server, serverroom) presidentoffice
copy file2 (server, serverroom) presidentoffice
delete file1 (president, presidentoffice) presidentoffice
delete file2 (president, presidentoffice) presidentoffice
logout server (serverroom) presidentoffice
enter saferoom () presidentoffice
open safe (saferoom) saferoom
close safe (saferoom) saferoom
enter presidentffice () saferoom
enter accountantoffice () corridor
enter corridor () accountantoffice
login server (serverroom) accountantoffice
copy file1 (server, serverroom) accountantoffice
copy file2 (server, serverroom) accountantoffice
delete file1 (president, accountantoffice) accountantoffice
delete file2 (president, accountantoffice) accountantoffice
logout server (serverroom) accountantoffice
login cloudlet (serverroom) mainarea
copy file3 (server, serverroom) mainarea
delete file3 (clientmanager, mainarea) mainarea
logout cloudlet (serverroom) mainarea
enter clientmanageroffice () corridor
enter corridor () clientmanageroffice
login server (serverroom) clientmanageroffice
copy file1 (server, serverroom) clientmanageroffice
delete file1 (clientmanager, clientmanager) clientmanageroffice
logout server (serverroom) clientmanageroffice
login cloudlet (serverroom) clientmanageroffice
copy file3 (server, serverroom) clientmanageroffice
delete file3 (clientmanager, clientmanageroffice) clientmanageroffice
logout cloudlet (serverroom) clientmanageroffice
delete file1 (clientmanager, presidentoffice) presidentoffice
(To be continued)
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Table A4
No.
p46
p47
p48
p49
p50
p51
p52
p53
p54
p55
p56
p57
p58
p59

Permission
open box (telleroffice) telleroffice
close box (telleroffice) telleroffice
delete file1 (teller, telleroffice) telleroffice
delete file1 (teller, presidentoffice) presidentoffice
delete file1 (teller, accountanoffice) accountantoffice
delete file2 (teller, accountanoffice) accountantoffice
delete file1 (accountan, telleroffice) telleroffice
delete file1 (accountant, presidentoffice) presidentoffice
delete file1 (accountant, accountantoffice) accountantoffice
delete file2 (accountant, accountantoffice) accountantoffice
login server (serverroom) mainarea
logout server (serverroom) mainarea
delete file3 (lobbymanager, mainarea) mainarea
delete file1 (lobbymanager, presidentoffice) presidentoffice
Table A5

No.
c1
c2

Topology constraints on the UE relation.

Topology constraint
:.UserRoleactivate .Tom; teller/ ^ UserLocation .Tom; accountantoffice//
:.UserRoleactivate .Tom; accountant/ ^ UserLocation .Tom; accountantoffice//

Table A6
No.
c10
c20
c30
c40
c50
c60
c70
c80
c90
c100
c110
c120
c130
c140
c150

Permissions of the bank.

Topology constraints on the PA relation.

Topology constraint
RoleObject .lobbymanager; clouldet/
ObjectLocation .cloudet; serverroom/
RoleLocation .lobbymanager; mainarea/
RoleObject .lobbymanager; server/
ObjectLocation .server; serverroom/
RoleLocation .president; presidentoffice/
RoleLocation .accountant; accountantoffice/
RoleLocation .president; accountantoffice/
RoleLocation .teller; accountantoffice/
RoleLocation .teller; telleroffice/
RoleLocation .clientmanager; presidentoffice/
RoleLocation .teller; presidentoffice/
RoleLocation .lobbymanager; presidentoffice/
RoleLocation .accountant; presidentoffice/
ObjectLocation .file2; .president; presidentoffice//

(Continued)
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